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The Care Work and the Economy (CWE-GAM) Project strives to reduce gender gaps in economic 
outcomes and enhance gender equality by illuminating and properly valuing the broader economic 
and social contributions of caregivers and integrating care in macroeconomic policymaking toolkits. 
We work to provide policymakers, scholars, researchers and advocacy groups with gender-aware 
data, empirical evidence, and analytical tools needed to promote creative, gender-sensitive 
macroeconomic and social policy solutions. In this era of demographic shifts and economic change, 
innovative policy solutions to chronic public underinvestment in care provisioning and 
infrastructures and the constraints that care work places on women’s life and employment choices 
are needed more than ever. Sustainable development requires gender-sensitive policy tools that 
integrate emerging understandings of care work and its connection with labor supply, and 
economic and welfare outcomes. 
Find out more about the project at www.careworkeconomy.org. 
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The aim of this paper is to develop a feminist post-Keynesian/post-Kaleckian demand-led 
growth model to theoretically analyse the role of labour market policies and fiscal policies 
on growth and employment. 
We develop a three-sector gendered macroeconomic model with physical and social 
sectors (health, social care, education, child care) in the public and private market 
economy, and an unpaid reproductive sector providing domestic care. The production in 
the market economy is performed by male and female paid labour and capital.  
On the demand side, we model behavioural equations for household consumption as a 
function of male and female wage income and profits. Consumption by the households 
can be on social services and the rest of the economy. We model private investment as a 
function of the profit share, GDP, and public debt to GDP ratio, which in turn affects the 
interest rate. Exports are a function of real unit labour costs (wage/productivity) and the 
GDP of the rest of the world. Imports are a function of real unit labour costs and the 
GDP. Real unit labour costs are the inverse of the profit share. Taxes are collected on 
wage and profit income. We model three types of government spending are modelled: In 
addition to physical infrastructure, which is traditionally recognized as public investment, 
we define current public spending in health, social care, education, and child care as public 
social infrastructure investment. The rest of the current government spending is defined 
as government consumption expenditure.  
On the supply side, productivity in the physical sector is exogenous in the short run and 
endogenously changes in the long-run, and is a function of public physical and social 
infrastructure and current spending, household spending in the social sector, unpaid 
domestic care labour, wages of men and women, and growth.  
Employment (in hours) is determined by output and labour productivity. Female and male 
labour supplies depend on wages, benefits and social infrastructure. 
Demand has an effect on growth both in the short and the long run, as the model builds 
on realistic structural features of a capitalist market economy operating with excess 
capacity and involuntary unemployment. Gendered structural features regarding both the 
paid and reproductive unpaid labour such as gendered sectoral composition of 
employment, occupational segregation, institutions, and social norms regarding gendered 
consumption behaviour as well as the distribution of unpaid domestic care labour affect 
growth, productivity and employment.  
The model aims to provide a theoretical basis to analyse the impact of gender equality and 
public spending. We provide a theoretical analysis of the effects on GDP, productivity 
(GDP per employee) and employment of men and women in both the short run and long 
run as a consequence of i) the impact of fiscal policies, in particular public spending in 
social infrastructure, and ii) decreasing gender wage gaps, in particular in the female 
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dominated social sector. This theoretical analysis provides a basis to further analyse the 
impacts of i) particular paths to closing gender wage gaps, e.g. via an upward convergence 
in wages, i.e. an increase in both male and female wages with a faster increase in the 
latter; ii) other types of fiscal spending, and  iii) taxes on labour and capital income.  
Crucially, a change in gender pay gap or the functional distribution of income between 
wages and profits or public spending in social vs. physical infrastructure will have both 
demand side effects in short- and long-run and supply side effects in the long run and 
affect output, productivity and the employment and income of men and women.  
We develop our model by bringing together two traditions, namely Post-Kaleckian 
economics and feminist economics.   
There is a large body of research on the impact of gender inequality on growth and 
human development  in developing countries, The existing literature concurs that 
women’s bargaining power within the household is enhanced when they command 
resources and this translates into improved human development (Duflo, 2003; Duflo and 
Udry, 2004; Himmelweit et al., 2013; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Quisumbing and 
Maluccio, 2003; Thomas, 1990; Hashemi et al., 1996; Kabeer, 2001; Littlefield, 2003; 
Morrison, 2007; Pitt et al., 2006). Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) and Thomas (1997) 
showed that a rise in women´s share of cash income in Ivory Coast and Brazil  leads to an 
increase in spending on nutritional, health, and education expenditures as well, whereas 
the share of spending on private goods for men is decreasing. Similar results are found by 
Doss (2005), Duflo and Udry (2004), Morrison  (2007), Phipps and Burton (1998) 
Rubalcava et al. (2004), Lundberg et al. (1997). An increase in assets controlled by women 
is positively associated with children´s educational attainment and with their nutritional 
status– especially of girls (Doepke and Tertilt, 2011; Duflo, 2003; Engle, 1993; Gitter and 
Barham, 2008; Thomas, 1990).  
Braunstein (2013) argues that the impact of income on human capacities depends not 
only on how much is earned and spent, but on what is purchased, and whether these 
commodities provide good substitutes or complements for unpaid care time. At first 
glance, women need to spend more of their income on social services to replace their 
unpaid reproductive labour, assuming these services are not freely provided by the public 
sector. More income in the hands of women or the presence of an employed mother in 
the household increases household spending on children (Lundberg et al, 1997; Pahl, 
2000; Cappellini et al, 2014). Microeconomic studies across the board to a great extend 
attest that a larger share of women’s income compared to that of men’s, is spend to 
satisfy the needs of the household (Blumberg, 1991; Antonopoulos et al, 2010; Pahl, 
2000) and a possible increase in their income leads to increased spending on children’s 
education and wellbeing (Vogler and Pahl, 1994; Lundeberg et al. 1997; Cappellini et al 
2014), with further implications for the distribution of power within the household too 
(Vogler and Pahl, 1994). Men’s income on the other hand, tends to be spent on capital 
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intensive and luxury goods. Seguino (2010; 2012) and Kabeer (1997) suggested that in 
developing countries women are more likely to consume domestically produced goods, 
while men are more likely to consume a higher proportion of luxury and/or imported 
goods (such as cell phones, automobiles and televisions). These studies highlight the 
positive effect that higher incomes for women can have for an economy, by shifting the 
consumption towards goods that have long-term impacts in the quality of life and 
workforce. 
An area where this becomes more pronounced is unpaid caring labour where women 
carry unevenly more burden than men, with implications for growth (Seguino, 2010; 
2012; Antonopoulos et al., 2010, Braunstein et al., 2011). Similarly, the increase and 
intensification of unpaid household labour compensate for the continuous shrinking of 
public services provision in health, social care and education, due to budget cuts, leading 
to higher intergenerational costs. Folbre (1995), Himmelweit et al. (2014), Pahl (1997), and 
Nelson (1996) stress the importance of including the unpaid care work largely done by 
women for the smooth running of society and the economy in economic analysis. The 
term “reproductive labour” used to describe this includes all the activities that in general 
ensure that the workforce is fed, healthy, and able to work. However, it will be wrong to 
claim that all of this caring activity takes part in the unpaid economy; the state is 
responsible to a large extend for the provision of services such as healthcare, childcare 
and education, in most countries of the world. Care is also increasingly commodified, 
provided by the private sector subject to the dynamics of markets.   
Dissecting the household is fundamental in understanding how the inclusion of gender in 
a demand-led growth model would bring new insights. Households are understood as 
sources both of consumption and labour supply. The relations of power within a 
household as an outcome of the participation of women in paid employment have been 
well documented (Agarwal, 1997; and for a more extensive review see Himmelweit et al. 
2013; De Henau and Himmelweit, 2013). Households provide unpaid work for the 
reproduction of the labour force (van Staveren 2010; De Henau and Himmelweit 2013b; 
Hamner and Akram-Lodhi 1998; Nelson 1996). The household is also a key source of 
demand for the economy. Consequently, another important empirical question to explore 
is how a higher degree of gender equality in wages or employment could change the 
composition of consumption. There is limited empirical research on the differences in 
propensities to consume by men and women, as well as the composition of consumption 
with respect to types of goods and services and their import content.  
The provision of social welfare is usually undertaken by the state, by means of public 
spending in the social care sector, which not only has the potential to reduce women’s 
care burden, but is also a sector where employment creation tends to be predominantly 
female (Antonopoulos et al., 2010; Braunstein et al. 2011; Seguino, 2012; Onaran, 2016). 
The degree by which these needs of the population are met determines the types of 
welfare regime of a country, and would influence how growth can improve gender 
equality. The manner a state can nurture or obstruct equality is explored in Braunstein et 
al.’s (2011) categorisation of social welfare networks, formal or informal. An informal social 
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welfare support can be formed by means of kinship or solidarity networks. These 
networks however have evolved not only as an outcome of cultural norms, but to replace 
the scarcity of formal social welfare provision. In the exactly opposite side, we find 
countries which have an efficient formal social welfare provision system, provided by the 
state that nurtures equality (Braunstein et al, 2011).  
Women do the majority of the unpaid reproductive labour, therefore the development of 
the social sector in the market economy with services provided by paid labour in the 
public sector, as well as the private sector, will have profound effects on women as well as 
on aggregate macroeconomic outcomes (Onaran, 2016; Folbre, 1995). First, on the supply 
side, this will reduce the need for unpaid labour to provide care, education and health, and 
improve the chances of women to participate in the paid economy. Secondly, on the 
demand side, given the current rates of occupational segregation the new jobs generated 
in the social sector will be traditionally female jobs, and thereby increase the employment 
chances of women (Tzannatos, 1995).  Thirdly, both the public supply of social services 
and increased paid employment opportunities could transform gender norms concerning 
divisions of labour both within the household and paid versus unpaid work (Folbre and 
Nelson, 2000).   
Furthermore, public investment in times of underemployment/ unemployment can 
compensate for the lack of effective demand in the economy, which can deter private 
investment (De Henau et al, 2016). A large body of research differentiates between two 
types of public spending, as productive (government capital spending), and unproductive 
expenditure (government current spending). Palley (2013) and Seguino (2012) for example 
consider public investment in technology and infrastructure productive expenditure and 
argue that it is leading to positive crowding in effects on private investment. Seguino 
(2012) however further distinguishes between public investment in physical and social 
infrastructure pointing out that both enhance the business environment and hence private 
investment. Elson (2016, 2017) and Women’s Budget Group make the case for labelling 
public social expenditures as social infrastructure due to their effects on productivity and 
benefits which accrue to the society as a whole. Most of the post-Keynesian/Kaleckian 
literature does not model the public sector, with the notable exceptions of Blecker (2002), 
Seguino (2012), and Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi (2017). 
Recent research highlights the beneficial effect of public social infrastructure spending on 
employment generation and economic growth. De Henau et al (2016) using input-output 
analysis find for seven OECD countries that investment in social infrastructure would 
create roughly double the amount of new jobs as investment in physical infrastructure 
(directly and through a strong multiplier effect). Their findings also note a decrease in the 
gender gap in employment with more investment in social infrastructure, reflecting in part 
the concentration of women in the social sector. In a similar vein, Bargawi and Cozzi 
(2014) using the Cambridge Alphametrics Model (CAM), compare and contrast three 
scenarios for Europe: continued austerity, gender-neutral expansionary scenario and 
gendered expansionary scenario. Projections for their gendered expansionary scenario 
suggest that an additional 7.3 million jobs for women could be created in the Eurozone 
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and the United Kingdom by government expenditure in social infrastructure (as opposed 
to reduction of public spending). Additionally, they find that higher growth rates under the 
gendered scenario can lead to significant reductions of debt-to-GDP ratios and lower 
budget deficits. Antonopoulos et al (2010) for the USA using micro-simulation find that 
for the same amount of investment in the social sector and physical infrastructure 
investment the number of jobs created from investment in social care is more than double 
(1.2 million vs 550,000 jobs) than in the alternative scenario of physical infrastructure 
investment, reducing significantly the gender employment gap. Antonopoulos and Kim 
(2008) examining South Africa make similar observations to the study for the USA for an 
increase in public spending in social infrastructure. Finally, Ilkkaracan et al (2015) 
investigating the impact of public investment in social care services on employment, 
gender equality and poverty in Turkey, find that fiscal prioritization of early childhood care 
and preschool education as a subsector of social infrastructure compared to investment in 
physical infrastructure and cash transfers “presents an enormous potential for decent job 
creation, particularly in the female-dominated occupations and sectors” (p. 7). 
Antonopoulos et al. (2010) and Ilkkaracan et al. (2015) use micro household data to match 
the macro labour demand with personal characteristics of the working age population to 
model employment effects on women and men. Ilkkaracan and Kim (2018, also in ILO 
2018) extend the input-output analysis regarding impact of public spending in early 
childhood care, education, health and long-term care to 45 countries. 
To summarize, the literature in the nexus of gender equality- public spending- human 
development in developing countries underlines the fact that greater public spending in 
services that reduce the care burden of women empower them in many levels: increased 
financial independence, higher literacy and better health outcomes for them and their 
children, thus ensuring not only short term effects (higher labour force participation), but 
significant long run effects (higher productivity, better quality of workforce and shifting 
gender stereotypes).  
2.1. FEMINIST POST-KEYNESIAN/POST-KALECKIAN MACROECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 
The discussion above shows that there is a multilevel positive correlation between gender 
equality and macroeconomic growth; however most Kaleckian models (e.g. Bhaduri and 
Marglin, 1990; Blecker 2002; Stockhammer et al. 2009; Onaran et al., 2011; Onaran and 
Galanis 2014; Onaran and Obst, 2016; Obst, Onaran, Nikolaidi, 2017; Hein and Vogel, 
2008; Naastepad and Storm, 2006/7; Stockhammer and Onaran, 2004; Onaran and 
Stockhammer, 2005; Hein and Tarassow, 2010; Naastepad, 2006)  have not integrated 
these linkages with the notable exceptions Ertürk and Çağatay (1995); Blecker and 
Seguino, (2002); Braunstein et al, (2011); Seguino (2010, 2012), Braunstein et al., (2018) 
and Onaran, Oyvat, Fotopoulou (2018).  
Ertürk and Çağatay’s landmark 1995 paper was the first attempt to analyse empirically the 
relationship between women’s share of the workforce and long-term economic growth 
and short-term macroeconomic changes, with reference to structural adjustment policies. 
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Using cross-country data for 1985 and 1990, they conclude that structural adjustment 
policies lead to the feminization of the labour force, through changes in income 
distribution, reflected in decreasing wage shares in manufacturing, and through shifts in 
the outward orientation of the economy as measured by the increase in the ratio of 
exports to GNP.  
Blecker and Seguino (2002) analyse the impact of a rise in women’s wages relative to 
men’s on export competitiveness and growth. They argue that under certain parameters, 
gender equity may not be compatible with growth in export-oriented semi-industrialised 
economies. Their analysis is informed by the fact that in the labour markets of many 
developing countries female workers in the export sector face employment constraints 
that result in their segregation in export sector jobs at lower wages than male workers 
receive in the non-export industries.  
Braunstein et al. (2011), incorporate reproduction in a structuralist/post-Keynesian model 
and introduce notions from the behavioural science explaining attitudes according to 
“altruist” or “selfish” types of economies, linking care with the gender-wage gap and 
gendered job segregation. Based on this analytical framework, Braunstein et al., (2018) 
analyse how care models, globalization and macroeconomic policy stance shape the 
macroeconomic structure and development trajectories of different economies using a 
principle component analysis.   
Seguino (2012), develops a two-sector model (human development sector vs. the rest) 
and argue that greater equality can either be a drag on or a stimulus to growth, depending 
on the type of inequality and macro-level policies regulating trade and investment. Under 
the right conditions, a more equitable distribution of income and opportunities (in the 
form of human development) can be a self-sustaining stimulus to growth, with significant 
trans- generational effects. 
Our model synthesizes gendered post-Kaleckian models (Braunstein et al, 2011; Seguino, 
2010; 2012), post-Kaleckian models which explicitly incorporate the public sector (Obst, 
Onaran, Nikolaidi, 2017; Seguino, 2012) and post- Kaleckian models which integrate both 
the demand and supply side and short and long-run analysis (Hein and Tarassow 2010, 
Naastepad, 2006, Seguino, 2010; 2012). Furthermore, we explicitly model employment 
and not just output. The importance of post-Keynesian/Kaleckian macroeconomic models 
for our purposes is that it puts inequality at the heart of the determination of demand and 
output, as they integrate the dual role of wages as cost and as source of demand. These 
models accept the direct positive effects of higher profits on private investment and net 
exports as emphasised in mainstream models, contrasting these positive effects with the 
negative effects on consumption. Demand plays a central role in determining output and 
employment, and the distribution of income between workers and capitalists (wages and 
profits) have a crucial effect on demand. These models allow for involuntary 
unemployment, underemployment, and excess capacity (Onaran, 2016). This approach is 
different from the neoclassical macroeconomic models based on microeconomic decisions 
of optimizing agents. Components of aggregate demand are determined by behavioural 
 Page | 7  
 
CWE-GAM WORKING PAPER SERIES 19-04 
equations. Wages are an outcome of a bargaining process between employers and 
workers as opposed to the neoclassical theory, where they are determined by the 
marginal product of labour. Neoclassical labour supply is based on the choice between 
leisure and consumption. The difference of the demand-led models of output and 
employment is that unemployment is involuntary. Labour supply is inelastic and 
employment is demand-constrained, not supply-determined. In this respect, the upwards 
convergence of wages, coupled with public social and physical investment can lead to 
higher human development and growth (Seguino, 2012). Public investment can partially 
be self-financing in the sense that it creates the conditions for crowding in of private 
investment, stimulating labour productivity, and growth thus generating tax revenues 
(Seguino, 2016). 
The gender pay gap in this analysis translates social norms and prejudice into economic 
behaviour, assuming a preference by employers for a particular type of workers 
(black/white, or by extension, male/female) as well as endogenously determined education 
outcomes and labour supply behaviour. From a feminist political economy approach 
gender wage gap is determined by the relative bargaining power of men and women vis-a-
vis capital, which for the purpose of this paper is considered as exogenously determined. 
In this section, we develop a feminist post-Kaleckian model that considers gender 
inequalities and social infrastructure investment. In this paper, we introduce a model with 
two workers, female and male, which are respectively demonstrated by scripts F and M in 
the equations. We disaggregate profit share into its components: output, female and male 
wage rates, and female and male paid employment.  This would allow us to examine the 
impact of changing wage-gaps and different policies on output and paid employment of 
female and male workers. The profits are earned by the capitalists, which are genderless 
for simplicity in our model. 
The model has two sectors, public social sector, which consists of the expenditures of the 
government in education, childcare, healthcare, and social care (demonstrated with script 
H), and the rest of the economy or N sector (demonstrated with script N). The public 
spending in this social sector is defined as investment in social infrastructure in line with 
the feminist economics literature (Elson, 2016, 2017; Women’s Budget Group, 2015). We 
also introduce household’s spending in marketized social services. Both public and 
household’s social expenditures have short-run demand effects and influence labour 
productivity in the long-run. Appendix 1 presents list of the variables in the model. 
In line with Braunstein et al, (2011) and Braunstein et al., (2018), we also model unpaid 
care labour within the household, and its effects on productivity.  
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 Aggregate output (𝑌𝑡) is the sum of total male wage bill (𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀), total female wage 
bill (𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹) and profits (𝑅𝑡).  
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑅𝑡 (1) 
 
 The total wage bill for female workers (𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹) is a function of female wages in the 
social sector (𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹), female employment in the social sector (𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹), female wages in the rest 
of the economy (𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹), and female employment in the rest of the economy (𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹): 
 𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 = 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹 +𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 (2) 
 
 Similarly the total wage bill for male workers (𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀) is a function of male wages in 
the social sector (𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀), male employment in the social sector (𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀), male wages in the 
rest of the economy (𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀), and male employment in the rest of the economy (𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀): 
 
 𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀 = 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀 +𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 (3) 
 
The data for selected emerging economies in Table 1 below show that average hourly 
male wages are significantly higher than average hourly female wages for most of the 
developing economies. There is also significant occupational/sectoral segregation with 
women constituting the majority in the social sector and are substantially 
underrepresented in the rest of the economy.  
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Table 1: The gender wage ratio and share of female employment in selected emerging 
economies 
Country Year 
Average male 
wage / 
Average 
female wage 
(total 
economy, 
hourly wages) 
Women’s 
share of 
employment 
in the total 
economy, 
(hours 
worked) 
Women’s 
share of 
employment 
in the social 
sector (no of 
persons) 
Women’s 
share of 
employment  
in the rest of 
the economy) 
no of persons 
Argentina 2014 0.965 0.413 0.738 0.378 
Bolivia 2014 1.066     
Brazil 2014 1.190 0.428 0.737 0.403 
Chile  2013 1.259 0.403 0.676 0.402 
Colombia  2016 1.003     
Costa Rica  2016 0.960 0.367    
Dominican 
R. 
2015 1.080 0.383 0.762 0.365 
Ecuador 2014 1.148 0.392 0.638 0.378 
El Salvador 2014 0.950 0.425 0.679 0.414 
Guatemala 2014 1.007 0.345 0.644 0.335 
Honduras 2014 0.869     
Malaysia 2015 0.978 0.382 0.706 0.360 
Mexico  2014 1.072 0.380 0.612 0.366 
Nicaragua 2014 1.027     
Pakistan 2016 1.121 0.232 0.397 0.225 
Paraguay 2015 0.982 0.413    
Peru 2014 1.258 0.452 0.534 0.448 
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Russia 2015 1.323 0.487    
South Korea  2016 1.506 0.424    
Thailand 2016 0.822 0.456 0.734 0.445 
Ukraine 2016 1.255 0.481    
Uruguay 2014 1.094 0.445 0.738 0.421 
Venezuela 2006 1.068     
Vietnam 2016 1.120 0.485    
        
AVERAGE   1.088 0.410 0.661 0.380 
Notes: Authors’ own calculations from ILO (2018)’s Global Wage Database. We report the latest 
observations for the emerging economies, which have data on average male and female wages for 2000s. 
Employees in healthcare, social care and education activities are considered as part of the social sector and 
employees in other activities are considered as part of the rest of the economy. 
 
The data for selected emerging economies (Table 1) show that average hourly male wages 
are significantly higher than average hourly female wages for most of the developing 
economies. Therefore, we define gender wage gaps (𝛼𝑡) for wages in H and N sectors as 
below:  
 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 =
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 ,      𝛼𝑡
𝐻 =
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹   (4) 
N sector produces the majority of the economic market activities output; therefore, 
following Table 1 we consider that 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 > 1 is more likely for most of the developing 
economies. It is also likely that  𝛼𝑡
𝐻 > 1 based on evidence from the UK, where 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 is 1.8 
and 𝛼𝑡
𝑁is 1.2 in 2013 (own calculations based on EU KLEMS data). 
The aggregate output in the market economy (GDP, excluding unpaid activities) is  
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 + 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡
𝐶 + 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑋𝑡 −𝑀𝑡 (5) 
 Page | 11  
 
CWE-GAM WORKING PAPER SERIES 19-04 
where 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 is households’ social expenditures1,  𝐶𝑡
𝑁 is consumption in the rest of the 
economy, 𝐼𝑡 is private investment expenditures, 𝐺𝑡
𝐻  is government’s social infrastructure 
expenditures , 𝐺𝑡
𝐶  is government’s consumption expenditures, 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 is public investments 
other than investments in the social sector2, 𝑋𝑡 is exports of goods and services and 𝑀𝑡 is 
imports of goods and services.   The public social expenditures is a fiscal policy decision 
targeted as a share of aggregate output (𝜅𝑡
𝐻), and constitutes the public social sector 
output (𝑌𝑡
𝐻)3. The rest of the GDP is the market output in the rest of economy (𝑌𝑡
𝑁): 
 𝑌𝑡
𝐻 = 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 = 𝜅𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡 (6) 
  
 𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑌𝑡(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) (7) 
 
The share of government’s consumption expenditures (𝐺𝑡
𝐶) and public investments other 
than social infrastructure investment in the social sector (𝐼𝑡
𝐺) are also determined by 
government as a share of aggregate output and are respectively 𝜅𝑡
𝐶 and 𝜅𝑡
𝐺: 
 𝐺𝑡
𝐶 = 𝜅𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝑡 (8) 
 
 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 = 𝜅𝑡
𝐺𝑌𝑡 (9) 
 
                                              
1 While theoretically household consumption of social services amount to investment in human 
infrastructure as well and affects productivity in our model, as discussed below, we preserved the term 
“consumption” for this category consistent with the definitions in national accounts. 
2 Government’s social infrastructure expenditures are classified as current spending on labour services in the 
national accounts. The physical infrastructure associated with providing social infrastructure such as schools 
and hospitals are counted as physical infrastructure. Hence part of 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 also contributes to social 
infrastructure. However, our classification is important for a gendered analysis of the employment impact of 
different fiscal policy decisions as 𝐺𝑡
𝐻is very female labour intensive while construction, just as most other 
parts of 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 is male labour intensive. 
3 For simplicity, we assume that H sector only consists of the public social sector. The employment and 
supply in this sector is entirely financed by public social expenditures. The households’ private social 
consumption (see equation 22) is supplied by the private market output in the rest of economy (𝑌𝑡
𝑁). Hence, 
private social consumption do not directly contribute to the generation of employment in H sector; 
however, they affect labour productivity in the next period positively as discussed below.   
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 The employment in the N sector is output over labour productivity in the N sector 
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁): 
 𝐸𝑡
𝑁 =
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 =
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) 𝑌𝑡
𝑇𝑡
𝑁  (10) 
 
In our model, the share of female employment in N sector is exogenous and institutionally 
and socially determined leading to occupational segregation, and is demonstrated by 𝛽𝑡
𝑁. 
The male workers in N sector constitute (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁) of the sector4: 
 𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 =
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) 𝑌𝑡
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 𝛽𝑡
𝑁  =    
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 𝛽𝑡
𝑁 (11) 
 
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 =
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻) 𝑌𝑡
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)  =    
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁) (12) 
 
Table 1 shows that the number of male workers is greater than the number of female 
workers in N sector for all the emerging economies reported. Hence,  𝛽𝑡
𝑁 < 0.50 is a likely 
outcome for an emerging economy. In the UK, 𝛽𝑡
𝑁 is 0.42 and 𝛽𝑡
𝐻 is 0.76 in 2013 (own 
calculations based on EU KLEMS data). 
We assume that the wage bill paid to male and female workers in the social sector 
constitutes the public social expenditures and the social sector is not making profits. Any 
non-labour inputs used constitute part of government consumption (𝐺𝐶). Following this, 
the public social expenditure can be written as a function of employment (𝐸𝑡
𝐻), average 
female wage (𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻), average male wage (𝑤𝑡
𝑀𝐻), female employment share (𝛽𝑡
𝐻) and male 
employment share (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻) in the social sector.  
 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 = 𝜅𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑤𝑡
𝑀𝐻 (13) 
 
Using equations (13) and (4), we can write the total employment (𝐸𝑡
𝐻), female employment 
(𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹) and male employment (𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀) in the social sector as a function of public social 
expenditures and female wages in the social sector. 
                                              
4 For simplicity, we abstract from the presence of trans workers and classify them as 
either male or female in our model. 
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 𝐸𝑡
𝐻 =
𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
=
𝜅𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡
𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
 (14) 
 
 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹 =
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡
𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
 ,         𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀 =
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡
𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
 (15a,b) 
 
In Table 1, we observe that the share of female workers in social sector is larger than the 
share of female workers in N for all countries. Moreover, in all emerging economies 
except Pakistan, the share of female workers in the social sector are over 50%. Therefore, 
we can expect that a rise in the share of social sector in aggregate output would also pull 
the share of female workers in total employment to higher levels. 
  We model the unpaid domestic care labour (𝑈𝑡) within the households as  
log𝑈𝑡 = 𝑞0 + 𝑞𝐺 log𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑞𝐹 log𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑞𝑀 log𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 (16) 
 
For a given demographic structure defining care needs of a society, (𝑞0) the higher male 
and female paid employment is expected to have some negative impact on the supply of 
unpaid labour, since it would decrease the time that could be allocated for care or 
housework (𝑞𝐹 < 0, 𝑞𝑀 < 0). Higher government expenditures in the social sector are also 
expected to reduce the need in households for care; therefore, it would lead to lower 
unpaid labour (𝑞𝐺 < 0). We specify the equation in logs, since the impact of employment 
in N and public social expenditures on the time spent on unpaid domestic care might be 
non-linear (the negative impact might be decreasing in absolute values as it gets 
increasingly more difficult to decrease unpaid care at lower levels of unpaid care). 
Next, we define the profits (R) in the N sector. We consider that the income in the N 
sector are distributed between workers and capitalists as wages and profits. The profits 
are earned by the capitalists and is their income in the N sector after wage payments. 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡
𝑁 −  𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹  − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀 𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 = 𝑌𝑡
𝑁 − 𝐸𝑡
𝑁(𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝛼𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
= ((1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)𝑌𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡
𝑁(𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝛼𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹) 
(17) 
 
The profit share in the N sector is the share of profits in the output in the N sector. 
Therefore, the profit share could also be written as a function of female wages and labour 
productivity in the N sector: 
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 𝜋𝑡 =
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 −  𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹  − 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀 𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 = 1 − 
(𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁𝛼𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹 
𝑇𝑡
𝑁  (18) 
 
The next set of equations present the behavioural equations defining the demand side of 
the model. Consumption of households in goods and services other than social 
expenditures is a function of total wage income (wage bills) of female and male workers in 
H and N sectors and profit income of capitalists after taxes. 𝑡𝑡
𝑊 is the rate of tax on wages 
and 𝑡𝑡
𝑅  is the rate of tax on profits. Following previous empirical literature (e.g. Hein and 
Vogel, 2009; Molero-Simarro, 2011; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Onaran and Obst, 2016) 
in the post-Kaleckian literature that estimates the relationship between consumption, 
wages, and profits in logarithms; we define the logarithm of non-social consumption as 
functions of logarithms of after tax profits, and female and male wage bills in H and N 
sectors. The non-linearities in the relationship between sources of incomes and 
consumption might be an outcome of changing propensities to consume with changing 
incomes. 
 
log 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑅 log[𝑅𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)]
+ 𝑐𝑁𝐹 log[𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)] + 𝑐𝐻𝐹 log[𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)] + 𝑐𝑁𝑀 log[𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)]
+ 𝑐𝐻𝑀 log[𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)]  (19) 
The marginal propensity to consume in N is assumed to be different for male and female 
workers in the N sector, reflecting the gender pay gaps as well as differences in 
behaviour. We discuss this in more detail below while presenting the analysis of the 
model. 
The households’ social expenditures (𝐶𝑡
𝐻) is also a function of after tax profits and wage 
bills of female and male workers in N and H sectors, and governments’ social 
expenditures:  
 
log 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑧0 + 𝑧𝐺 log𝐺𝑡
𝐻
+ 𝑧𝑅 log[𝑅𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)]
+ 𝑧𝐹 log[𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)] + 𝑧𝑀 (log[𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊)]) 
(20) 
 
The marginal propensity to consume social goods is different for male and female workers 
in the N sector. We assume that the marginal propensity to consume social goods is the 
same for male and female workers working in the social sector in an attempt to simplify 
the model.5. Following this assumption, governments’ social expenditures (𝐺𝑡
𝐻) can i) 
                                              
5 As the majority of the workers in H are women, the impact of this simplification is not 
very important. The assumption helps to simplify the model by using only 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 to reflect the 
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increase households’ social expenditures by  providing wage income in the social sector, ii) 
decrease households’ social expenditures by reducing the need for these expenditures. 
We assume that the demand for 𝐶𝑡
𝐻  is provided by the private sector in the market 
economy as part of the output in the N sector, as mentioned above. 
Next, private investment (𝐼𝑡) is  
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑡 = 𝑖0 + 𝑖1log 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑖2𝑙𝑜𝑔 [𝜋𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅)] + 𝑖3 log (
𝐷
𝑌
)
𝑡
 (21) 
 
where 𝐷 is the public debt. The private investment is expected to increase as a result of 
higher aggregate output (𝑖1 > 0).  𝜋𝑡(1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅) is the after tax share of disposable profits in 
the N sector. Following Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) and Blecker (1989), we expect the 
profit share to have a positive direct impact on private investment (𝑖2 > 0). Last, we use 
the ratio of public debt to GDP, (𝐷/𝑌)𝑡, to consider the possible negative crowding out 
effects of rising public debt on the interest rate and thereby, private investment (𝑖3 < 0), 
as in Obst, Onaran, Nikolaidi (2017).  
The public debt at time t (𝐷𝑡) is the public debt accumulated from the public debt in the 
previous period (𝐷𝑡−1) with an interest rate of 𝑟𝑡−1, plus the total government expenditures 
at t, minus the taxes collected from profits and wages at time t.  
 𝐷𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝐺𝑡
𝐶 + 𝐼𝑡
𝐺 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑊(𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐹 +𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑀) − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅𝑡 (22) 
 
𝐷𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) 𝐷𝑡−1 +
𝑌𝑡
𝑁(𝜅𝑡
𝐻 + 𝜅𝑡
𝐶 + 𝜅𝑡
𝐺)
1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻 −𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹(𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀 + 𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹)𝑡𝑡
𝑊
−𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛼𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀 + 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹 )𝑡𝑡
𝑊 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑅(𝑌𝑡
𝑁 −𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹(𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀)) 
(22’) 
 
 Exports are shown by 𝑋:  
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑡 = 𝑥0 + 𝑥1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 + 𝑥2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡 + 𝑥3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜀𝑡 (23) 
 
The income of the trading partners (𝑌𝑡
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑) and the real deprecation in currency (𝑥3) 
increases the exports (𝑥1, 𝑥3  > 0). A rise in the profit share is equivalent to a fall in real 
                                              
demand effect while at the same time capturing the substitution effect of public social 
infrastructure provision on private demand for social expenditure. 
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unit labour costs, and hence would increase the export competitiveness and hence 
exports of an economy (𝑥2 > 0).  Imports are shown by 𝑀:  
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑡 = 𝑛0 + 𝑛1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑛2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜋𝑡 + 𝑛3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜀𝑡 (24) 
 
Higher domestic demand in the N sector would stimulate the demand on imported goods 
and services (𝑛1 > 0) and the real deprecation in currency (𝑥3) reduces the imports (𝑛3 <
0). A rise in the profit share would decrease imports, because it would increase the 
competitiveness of domestic goods against imported products.  
This is a reduced form modelling of the relative price effects on exports and imports. 
Domestic prices and export prices are functions of nominal unit labour costs, based on a 
mark-up pricing model in an imperfectly competitive economy. Exports are a function of 
relative prices of exports to imports, and imports are a function of domestic prices relative 
to import prices. As nominal unit labour costs are real unit labour costs multiplied by 
domestic prices, and the wage share is identical to real unit labour costs, a fall in the wage 
share, i.e. a rise in the profit share, leads to a fall in relative prices and improves net 
exports, depending on the labour intensity of exports, the pass through from labour costs 
to export prices and domestic prices and the price elasticity of exports and imports. To 
simplify the model we do not present the price equations and relative price effects on net 
exports. Our claim on the impact of profit share on net exports is also supported by the 
previous empirical literature. For 7 large emerging economies (Turkey, South Korea, 
Mexico, China, India, Argentina, South Africa), Onaran and Galanis (2014) find that an 
increase in profit share increases exports and reduces imports6. Similarly, Yilmaz (2015) 
and Jetin and Kurt (2016) also respectively find a strong positive impact of profit shares 
on net exports in Turkey and Thailand. Alarco (2016) finds negative impact of wage share 
on net exports in 16 Latin American countries, although the impact for some of the 
countries is insignificant. 
Finally, on the supply side of the model, labour productivity is constant in the short run 
and changes endogenously in the long run in the rest of the economy, as we assume 
technological change or adoption of new techniques take time. We assume productivity in 
the social sector is given and simply equal to output per hour of employment in both the 
short and the long run.7  Labour productivity in the N sector (𝑇𝑡
𝑁)  is  
                                              
6 The effects of profit share were significant for all except profit share’s impact on South 
Africa’s exports.  
7 Output in H is simply equal to the wage bill in H, as there is no profit in H. Increasing 
productivity in H is less related to the availability of technology or better skills, as the 
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log 𝑇𝑡
𝑁 = ℎ0 + ℎ1 log𝐺𝑡−1
𝐻 + ℎ2 log 𝐼𝑡−1
𝐺 + ℎ3 log𝐺𝑡−1
𝐶
+ ℎ4 log 𝑌𝑡−1 + ℎ5 log𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 + ℎ6 log(𝛼𝑡−1
𝑁 𝑤𝑡−1
𝑁𝐹 ) + ℎ7 log 𝐶𝑡−1
𝐻
+ ℎ8 log𝑈𝑡−1 + ℎ9 log 𝑇𝑡−1
𝑁  
(25) 
 
In the long run, the labour productivity is likely to be positively influenced by lagged 
values of government’s social infrastructure investment as well as government’s 
consumption expenditures and other public investment (ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3 > 0). We also expect 
households’ consumption expenditures in marketized social services (CH) and domestic 
unpaid care labour to affect labour productivity positively (ℎ7, ℎ8 > 0). Nevertheless, we 
expect the effects of these to be realised over the longer-run, namely in the next period. 
Higher output would also lead to higher labour productivity due to Verdoorn effect 
(Naastepad, 2006; Hein and Tarassow, 2010), as greater scale can lead to more efficient 
allocation of sources (ℎ4 > 0). Moreover, following Marx (1867) and later the theoretical 
contributions and empirical findings of Naastepad (2006) and Hein and Tarassow (2010), 
we consider that higher female and male wages in N leads to capitalists’ preference 
towards labour-saving technologies, which would increase the labour productivity 
(ℎ5, ℎ6 > 0). This is also consistent with the new Keynesian efficiency wage theories 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  Higher output and higher wages have also a lagged effect, 
since the change in technology and/or techniques pushed by these factors would require 
time. This is also consistent with Hein and Tarassow (2010) that estimates lagged positive 
effects of wages and output on labour productivity.  Last, the labour productivity in the 
previous period is also positively related with the productivity in the current period, since 
part of the technology from the last period would be transferred to the following period 
(ℎ9 > 0). The next period is a sufficiently long time period for these effects to be realised, 
e.g. five years or more; furthermore the time required for these different factors to affect 
productivity is an empirical question; e.g. the impact of public investment in childcare may 
take longer than the impact of other types of government spending or higher wages. In 
the theoretical model, we abstract from differences in the lag structure of the effects. 
Appendix 2 presents a further simplification of the productivity for the purposes of the 
analytical solution in the next section. Unpaid domestic care labour, U is shared between 
women (UF) and men (UM), where βd is the share of UF in U, and is exogenous and 
institutionally and socially determined:  
 𝑈𝑡
𝐹  =  𝛽𝑑𝑈𝑡 (26) 
 
 
                                              
quality of these services is more important and is in many cases requires more hours of 
nurses, care workers, teachers per patient or student. 
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 𝑈𝑡
𝑀  =  (1 − 𝛽𝑑  )𝑈𝑡 (27) 
 
 
In case of extreme gender inequality 𝛽𝑑 = 1. 
Female and male labour force participation rates (labour force as a ratio to population, NtF 
and NtM) are positive functions of average wages, benefits and social infrastructure and 
negative functions of Ut. Hence female and male labour force is 
 
 𝐿𝑡
𝐹 = (𝑙1𝐹(𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝐻 +𝑤𝑡
𝐹𝑁) + 𝑙2𝐹𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑙3𝐹𝑈𝑡
𝐹)𝑁𝑡
𝐹 (28) 
 
 𝐿𝑡
𝑀 = (𝑙1𝑀(𝑤𝑡
𝑀𝐻 +𝑤𝑡
𝑀𝑁) + 𝑙2𝑀𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑙3𝑀𝑈𝑡
𝑀)𝑁𝑡
𝑀
 (29) 
 
For simplicity we consider benefits as part of 𝐺𝑡
𝐻. 
Population, NtF and NtM are equal to past population plus net migration (NMt) plus the 
number of new born minus the number of deaths, where fertility (death rate) is a positive 
(negative) function of social infrastructure and unpaid care: 
 
 𝑁𝑡
𝐹 = 𝑁𝑡−1
𝐹 +𝑁𝑀𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑛1𝐹𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑛2𝐹𝑈𝑡
𝐹 (30) 
 
 𝑁𝑡
𝑀 = 𝑁𝑡−1
𝑀 +𝑁𝑀𝑡
𝑀 + 𝑛1𝐹𝐺𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑛2𝐹𝑈𝑡
𝐹 (31) 
 
If employment grows faster than the labour force for a particular type of worker, 
unemployment rate will decrease, and vice versa. If demand for employment, E, for a 
particular type of worker is not met by an increase in labour supply due to constraints in 
supply, e.g. a low female labour supply due to lack of provision of public social 
infrastructure for care, either there will be an exogenous increase in labour supply due to 
migration, or gender norms and occupational segregation coefficients will change or 
wages will adjust. While in our model for simplicity we ignore the feedback effects of 
changes in labour supply and consequently unemployment on wages, it is realistic to 
assume that in the long run changes in labour demand vs labour supply can lead to 
changes in wages. Changes in population via increased migration, to relax labour supply 
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constraints in the care economy due to rising need for care work along with rising female 
employment is also not analysed in this model, and is assumed to be exogenous.  
Similarly a rise in wages in a particular sector, e.g. H as an outcome of higher public social 
infrastructure, or a faster increase in wages in the social sector compared to wages in the 
rest of the economy is likely to lead to higher labour supply of both men and women, 
leading to also changes in the sectoral segregation ratios in the social sector and the rest 
of the economy, as well as a change in social gender norms and the distribution of unpaid 
domestic labour.  
While these are interesting extensions, they are outside the scope of this theoretical 
model, where our primary aim is to analyse the impact of public spending and exogenous 
changes in wages and gender pay gap on employment of women and men. 
3.1. THE IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURES ON OUTPUT, 
EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC DEBT 
In this section, we examine the short-run and long-run effects of an increase in the share 
of social expenditures in GDP on aggregate output, employment and public debt/GDP. In 
this section, we analyse the case where public social expenditure increases through new 
public sector employment in the social sector (𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀 = 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀∗, 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹 = 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹∗). We first 
examine the effect of social expenditures on aggregate output through direct stimulus by 
rising government expenditures and employment. Next, we will examine the impact of 
public social investment in the long-run, which will in turn effect labour productivity and 
public debt/GDP. We will also discuss the overall impact on female and male employment 
and public debt/GDP. Finally, we will examine and discuss how our results would change 
when public social expenditure rise through closing the gender wage gap in H (i.e. 
increasing female wages with a constant male wage) rather than generating new 
employment in H.   
3.1.1 THE SHORT-RUN EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE SHARE OF PUBLIC 
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT IN GDP 
 
We start our analysis with the short-run impact of the share of public social infrastructure 
investment (𝑡𝐻) in GDP on output. The overall impact (Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘 ) is the sum of public social 
infrastructure investment’s partial effect on each component of demand multiplied by the 
multiplier term: 
 Page | 20  
 
CWE-GAM WORKING PAPER SERIES 19-04 
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑡
𝐻
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
1 − |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
∗   
1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
 
(32) 
 
where 
𝜑𝑘 = |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑌𝑡
𝑁|
𝑡
𝐻
 
(33) 
  
The multiplier term is (
1
1−𝜑𝑘
) (
1
1−𝑡
𝐻) which is derived in Appendix 3. The outcomes of 
equation (32) is summarised in Figure 1. 
The partial effect of the public social expenditures on female and male employment is 
positive in the short-run as it generates new employment in the social sector and pushes 
total output to an upper level (See Appendix 4). Based on the female employment shares 
in Table 1 and as in the literature (e.g. Ilkkaracan et al, 2015), we expect the partial impact 
of public social expenditures on female employment relative to male employment in the 
social sector to be larger than the partial effects of all shocks in N sector (e.g. share of 
government’s consumption expenditures in GDP (𝜅𝑡
𝐶),  share of public investments other 
than social infrastructure investment in GDP (𝜅𝑡
𝐺), autonomous private investment (𝑖0)) as 
in equation (33)-(35). 
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Figure 1: The short-run impact of an increase in the share of public social expenditure in 
GDP on total output 
 
Figure 1 
* Based on Table 1, the positive partial impact of public expenditures is expected to be 
relatively larger for female employment compared to the partial impact from expenditures 
in N sector 
 
 
(𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝐹/𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝑀) > |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡
𝐶 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡
𝐶 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
⁄  
(33) 
 
(𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝐹/𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝑀) > |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡
𝐺 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
⁄  (34) 
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(𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝐹/𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝑀) > |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑖0
|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑖0
|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
⁄  (35) 
 
 
Moreover, the partial effect of public social expenditures on female employment in N 
(𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝐹) and male employment in N is zero (𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝑁𝑀), as the impact of social expenditures on 
productivity will be realised only in the next period.  
The short-run partial impact of public social expenditures (𝑡
𝐻) on consumption in N is 
given below for a given level of output in N sector (𝑌𝑡
𝑁=𝑌𝑡
𝑁∗).  
  |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝐻𝐹
𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐻𝐹 + 𝑐𝐻𝑀
𝑒𝑘𝑡
𝐻𝑀𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝛼𝑡
𝐻
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐻𝑀 ) > 0 (36) 
 
 
Higher public social expenditures will stimulate the consumption in N, since it will 
generate new employment and income in H. The magnitude of public social expenditures 
on  consumption in N depends on the marginal propensities to consume in H for the 
female and male workers.  
The short-run partial impact of public social expenditure (𝑡
𝐻) on consumption in H is   
  |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐺
1
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)𝑡
𝐻) (37) 
 
As discussed above, the sign of 𝑧𝐺 and hence equation (37) is ambiguous, but it’s likely to 
be negative. This is because a rise in public social expenditures could reduce the 
households’ need for social expenditures, although it generates new employment, hence 
income in the social sector.   
The partial effect of public social expenditures (𝑡
𝐻) on private investment is  
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  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖1
1
1 − 𝑡
𝐻 + 𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑘
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
)
 
 
 (38) 
 
where the impact through higher public debt is shown by 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑘  The first term in (38) shows 
the direct impact of rising public social expenditures on private investments. The short-run 
effect of public social expenditures on the profit share is zero for a constant output in the 
rest of economy, since public social expenditures do not affect labour productivity in the 
short-run. 
  |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 0 (39) 
 
However, for a constant output in N, the rising public social expenditures leads to a 
negative effect on private investment due to rising public debt/GDP (𝑖3 < 0) in the short-
run due to the crowding out effect. (See Appendix 4). However, this negative effect will 
be slightly moderated as tax revenues increase. Rising public social expenditures/GDP also 
increases the denominator of the public debt/GDP ratio.  
The short-run partial impact of public social expenditures on exports and imports is zero 
for a constant output in N, because its partial impact on the profit share is zero in the 
short-run. 
 
  |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑋𝑡
(
 
 
𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
= 0 (40) 
 
  |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
= 0 (41) 
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Finally, a rising share of public social expenditures has a positive effect on all types of 
public investment is positive as shown in equations (42)-(44). 
 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
> 0 (42) 
 
  |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
𝑡
𝐶𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
> 0 (43) 
 
  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡
𝐻|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
=
𝑡
𝐺𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)2
> 0 (44) 
 
3.1.2 THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE SHARE OF PUBLIC SOCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT IN GDP IN THE NEXT PERIOD 
 
The effect of a rising share of social expenditures in GDP on aggregate output in the next 
period is the sum of its partial impact on each component of GDP multiplied by the 
multiplier term,  
1
(1−𝜑𝑘)(1−𝑡
𝐻)
. 
Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 =
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻
=
|
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
− |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
+
|
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐺𝑡
𝐶
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
+ |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝐺
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜑𝑘)(1 − 𝑡
𝐻)
 
(45) 
 
The long-run impact in equation (45) is summarised in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: The long-run impact of an increase in the share of public social expenditure in 
GDP on total output  
 
Figure 2 
Notes: All variables without time represent the current period. 
*The impact of total output on imports is positive and the impact of imports on total output is negative.  
To derive the partial effect of 𝑡−1
𝐻  on each component of GDP, we first exhibit its 
influence on labour productivity as the public social investments affect the profit share 
and employment in the next period through labour productivity.  
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 |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑇𝑡
𝑁 (
ℎ1
𝑡−1
𝐻 +
ℎ7𝑧𝐺 + ℎ8𝑞𝐺
𝑡−1
𝐻 +
(ℎ1 + ℎ2 + ℎ3 + ℎ4)
𝑌𝑡−1
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘
+
((𝑧𝐺 + 𝑧𝑅 + 𝑧𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀)ℎ7 + (𝑞𝐺 + 𝑞𝐹 + 𝑞𝑀)ℎ8)
𝑌𝑡−1
Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘
−
ℎ7(𝑧𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀 − 𝑧𝑅) + ℎ8(𝑞𝐹 + 𝑞𝑀)
1 − 𝑡−1
𝐻 ) 
(46) 
 
The first term in parenthesis reflects the direct effect of public social investment on labour 
productivity. The second term is public social investment’s direct impact on labour 
productivity through households’ social expenditures and unpaid labour within the 
household as higher social expenditures would reduce the need for both. The third term 
shows the effect through rising output with higher public social expenditures, which will 
have an impact on labour productivity in the next term through output as well as the 
effects of other government expenditures which increase together with the rising 
aggregate output. The combination of last two terms is public social investment’s impact 
through changing unpaid labour and households’ social expenditures in parallel to the 
rising aggregate output.  
Figure 3 summarises the impact of the share of social expenditures in GDP on labour 
productivity in the next period. Overall, the total effect on productivity is ambiguous, and 
is likely to be positive. This is due to two reasons. First, for constant total income in N 
sector and without significant changes in the private funding of social spending, decline in 
public social expenditures is very unlikely to lead to a similar increase in households’ social 
expenditures that would reverse the negative effects of lower public social expenditures 
on labour productivity. Second, the unpaid care work that is expected to increase due to 
lower social expenditures is unlikely to compensate the positive effects of public social 
expenditures on labour productivity. 
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Figure 3: The summary of the impact of the share of public social expenditures in GDP on 
labour productivity in the next period 
 
Figure 3 
 
Next, we demonstrate the partial long-run impact of public social investment on each 
component of aggregate output. First, higher public social investment changes total wage 
bills and profits through employment, which in turn affect 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 and 𝐶𝑡
𝐻:  
 
 |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (𝑐𝑁𝐹
(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑐𝑁𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑁𝑀
− 𝑐𝑅
(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
) 
(47) 
 
 
 |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝐻
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐶𝑡
𝐻 (𝑧𝐹
(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑁𝐹 + 𝑧𝑀
𝛼𝑡
𝑁(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹)
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝑁𝑀
− 𝑧𝑅
(𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 𝛼𝑡
𝑁 + 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 )𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝑅𝑡
) 
(48) 
 
𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹  and 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀  are respectively the partial effect of the share of public social 
expenditures in GDP on female and male employment in N sector in the next period. The 
partial impact of  𝑡−1
𝐻  on employment in N will be through labour productivity as shown in 
Appendix 4. 
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The share of public social expenditures affects private investment through the effects on 
the profit share and public debt/GDP in the long-run: 
  |
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝐼𝑡
(
 
 
𝑖2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
+ 𝑖3
𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘
(
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
)
 
 
 (49) 
 
where 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘  is the partial effect of rising public social expenditures on public debt/GDP. 
The public social expenditures lead to accumulation of public debt that might become an 
impediment on the private investments in the next period. The public social expenditures 
also influence the labour productivity in the next period, which would change the 
denominator of public debt-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, public social expenditures change 
the distribution between wages and profits, which in turn affect public debt as the tax 
rates on different types of income are different. These effects are more in detail shown in 
Appendix 5. 
Higher public social expenditures affect the profit share in the next period through labour 
productivity:  
 |
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁 
= (
(𝛼𝑡
𝑁 − 𝛼𝑡
𝑁𝛽𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)𝑤𝑡
𝑁𝐹
(𝑇𝑡
𝑁)2
)  |
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
 (50) 
  
Finally, the share of public social expenditures in aggregate output affects exports and 
imports through the changes in the profit share, which is in turn affected through labour 
productivity:  
  |
𝜕𝑋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑋𝑡
(
 
 
𝑥2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (51) 
  |
𝜕𝑀𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
= 𝑀𝑡
(
 
 
𝑛2
|
𝜕𝜋𝑡
𝜕𝑡−1
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝜋𝑡
)
 
 
 (52) 
 
 Page | 29  
 
CWE-GAM WORKING PAPER SERIES 19-04 
3.1.3 THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE SHARE OF PUBLIC SOCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT IN GDP ON EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC 
DEBT 
 
A higher share of public social expenditure in GDP affects total female employment 
through rising aggregate output and its direct impact on creating employment in social 
sector:  
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 = (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑡
𝐻
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘
+
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)2
 
(53) 
 
The first term in (53) reflects that a higher share of public social expenditure in GDP 
affects the female employment in H and N through changes in the aggregate output. The 
second term in (53) shows the direct effect of expanding public social expenditures on 
generating employment in the social sector.  
Similarly, a higher share of social expenditures increases total male employment through 
aggregate output and its direct impact on creating employment in the social sector:  
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 = ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘
+
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)2
 
 
(54) 
 
Table 1 shows that 𝛽𝑡
𝐻 is larger than in 0.5 in all countries listed except  Pakistan. Based 
on this, we expect that the direct impact of rising public social expenditures on female 
employment is likely to be larger than its effect on male employment in most developing 
economies as shown below: 
 
 
(|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝐹
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
) =
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)2
>
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)2
= (|
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑀
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
+ |
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀
𝜕𝑡
𝐻 |
𝑌𝑡
) 
(55) 
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Overall, the impact of rising share of public social expenditures in GDP on employment is: 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 = (
1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹)Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘 +
𝑌𝑡
𝑁
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)2
 
 
(56) 
 
The impact of rising public social expenditures on total female employment in the long-run 
is:  
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝐹
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 = 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝐹 + (𝛽𝑡
𝑁
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘  (57) 
 
The public social expenditures have a partial impact on labour productivity in the next 
period, which also affects the female employment in N in the next period. This is shown 
by the first term of (57). The second term shows the impact of rising public social 
expenditures on female employment through aggregate output. 
The rising share of public social expenditures affects male employment in the long-run 
through its partial effect on labour productivity and employment (𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 ) and through 
aggregate output:  
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑀
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 = 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + ((1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝑁)
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
(1 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻)𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘  (58) 
 
The overall effect of rising public social expenditures on total employment in the long-run 
is given in equation (59). Figure 4 summarises the impact of higher share of public social 
expenditures as a share of GDP on employment. 
 
𝑑𝐸𝑡
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 = 𝑒𝑘(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑀 + (
(1 − 𝜅𝑡
𝐻)
𝑇𝑡
𝑁 +
𝜅𝑡
𝐻
𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹(𝛽𝑡
𝐻 + 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝛽𝑡
𝐻𝛼𝑡
𝐻)
)Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘  (59) 
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Figure 4: The summary of the impact of an increase in share of public social expenditures as 
a share of GDP on total employment in the short-run and in the next period 
 
Figure 4 
 
Finally, the impact of rising public expenditures on public debt/Y in the short-run and the 
impact in the next period are respectively as below:  
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡𝑡
𝑘  (60) 
 
𝑑 (
𝐷
𝑌)𝑡
𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 = 𝑑𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘 + 𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌Ψ𝑡(𝑡−1)
𝑘  (61) 
 
𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑌  is the impact of rising aggregate output on public debt/GDP as discussed in Appendix 
5. In equation (60) public social expenditures affect public debt/GDP through its short-run 
direct effect and its short-run effect on aggregate output. In equation (61) public social 
expenditures have a direct effect on the public debt/GDP and an effect through 
aggregate output in the next period. 
 
3.2 The impact of closing the gender wage gap in the H sector on output, employment 
and public finance 
In this section, we examine the case in which the share of public social expenditure in 
GDP increases through closing gender gap in H, rather than an increase in employment in 
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H. Hence, the gender wage ratio, 𝛼𝑡
𝐻 decreases with a rise in the female wage in H with a 
constant male wage (𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀 = 𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀∗). The employment in H sector is constant (𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹 =
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹∗,   𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀 = 𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝑀∗) for constant total output in N.  
The implications of this case is very similar to the case in which public social expenditure 
increases with generation of new employment in the public social sector. The main 
difference between the two cases is through consumption in N. In the short-run, the rising 
female wages in H would have a partial effect on consumption other than social 
expenditures solely through female consumption as shown in equation (62). 
  |
𝜕𝐶𝑡
𝑁
𝜕𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝐹|
𝑌𝑡
𝑁,𝑤𝑡
𝐻𝑀,𝐸𝑡
𝐻
= 𝑐𝐻𝐹𝐶𝑡
𝑁 (
𝐸𝑡
𝐻𝐹
𝑊𝐵𝑡
𝐻𝐹) > 0 (62) 
For the same amount of increase in 𝑡
𝐻 , whether the impact on 𝐶𝑡
𝑁 is larger for ‘higher 
employment in H’ or ‘closing gender wage gap in H case’ dependens on the marginal 
propensities to consume for female and male workers in H. If the marginal propensity to 
consume is larger for female workers in H, the impact through closing gender wage gap in 
H will be stronger, and if the marginal propensity to consume is larger for male workers 
the effect through higher employment in H will be stronger. 
For the same amount of increase in 𝑡
𝐻 , the short-run influence of closing gender pay gap 
in H on households’ social expenditures is the same as in the case of rising employment in 
H, as for simplicity in our model we did not distinguish the impact of female and male 
wages in H on households’ social expenditures. Similarly, for constant N output, closing 
gender pay gap in H influences private investments, government’s social expenditures, 
government’s consumption expenditures and public expenditures other than social 
investments in the short-run solely through the share of public social expenditures in 
GDP. For constant output in N, the partial impact of closing gender pay gap in H on 
exports and imports is zero, since the partial effect of the share of public social 
expenditures in GDP on profit share is also zero as in equation (39). The short-run impact 
of closing gender pay gap in H sector on total output is summarised in Figure 5 and the 
detailed effects are shown Appendix 7. 
  
 Page | 33  
 
CWE-GAM WORKING PAPER SERIES 19-04 
Figure 5: The short-run impact of closing gender pay gap in H sector on total output 
 
Figure 5 
  
Moreover, the impact of closing gender pay gap in H sector on the components of GDP in 
the next period is through labour productivity in the next period.  For constant male 
wages, the rising female wages in H sector affects the labour productivity through higher 
public social expenditures. Hence, we would expect effects similar to the case in which 
public social expenditures increase through rising employment in H as shown in Appendix 
7. The main difference arises due to the fact that, for the same amount of change in the 
share of public social expenditures in GDP, the short-run effects of rising female H wages 
on aggregate output is different. This is because aggregate output has a direct influence 
on labour productivity in the next period and has an indirect impact on labour productivity 
through unpaid labour, public consumption expenditures other than social expenditures, 
public social investment and  households’ social expenditures as shown in Figure 3. 
The short-run effect of higher female wages in H on total employment is solely through its 
effect on total output. Higher female wages effect total output in N, which leads to 
changes in employment in N. Moreover, the changes in total output also effect public 
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social expenditures through the multiplier effects which would further affect employment 
in H.  
The impact of higher female wages in H on employment in the next period is through the 
effect on total output and labour productivity in the next period. These effects are further 
discussed in Appendix 7. If closing gender pay gap in H leads to an increase in aggregate 
output greater than a possible increase in labour productivity, we would observe an 
increase in employment in the next period. 
Last, higher female wages in H has a direct impact on public debt-to-GDP ratio as share of 
public social expenditures in GDP rise and also has an indirect impact through aggregate 
output. Closing gender pay gap in H also affects the public debt-to-GDP ratio in the next 
period, since a part of the public debt in the short-run is transferred to the next period 
and higher female wages’ in H affect total output in both the short-run and the next 
period (Appendix 7).  
This paper developed a post-Keynesian/post-Kaleckian feminist demand-led growth 
model to theoretically analyse the role of labour market policies and fiscal policies on 
growth and employment. We presented a three sector gendered macroeconomic model 
with physical and social sectors (health, social care, education, child care) in the public and 
private market economy, and an unpaid reproductive sector providing domestic care. The 
production in the market economy is performed by male and female paid labour and 
capital.  
We provided a theoretical analysis of the effects on GDP, productivity (GDP per 
employee) and employment of men and women in both the short run and long run as a 
consequence of i) , fiscal policies, in particular public spending in social infrastructure, and 
ii) decreasing gender wage gaps in the female dominated social sector.  
This theoretical model can form the basis for the empirical analysis of gender equality and 
fiscal policy on growth and employment of men and women and serve as a tool for policy 
analysis and gender-responsive budgeting. The policy implications of the model can be 
discussed in the context of the stylised facts of a developing economy with a significant 
size of the unpaid reproductive economy, high gender pay and/or employment gaps, low 
female labour force participation rate and high occupational segregation. In particular, we 
can analyse the impact of a policy mix of upward convergence via a simultaneous increase 
in both female and male wages with closing gender pay gaps (faster increase in female 
wages than male wages) and a rise in public spending in social vs. physical investment, and 
discuss possible alternative outcomes based on alternative parameters of the model. 
The impact of government spending in the other sectors or changes in the tax rates are 
further potential extensions of the model. As the analytical solutions are symmetrical, we 
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do not present them in the paper. Three important policy implications to emphasize flow 
from our analysis:  
Regarding fiscal policy, we expect public investment in social infrastructure to reduce 
women’s unpaid domestic care work, while increasing their labour supply and enabling 
them to spend more time in paid work. Aggregate demand is stimulated both in the short 
and the long run, with positive effects on employment. Due to sectoral and occupational 
segregation, public spending in social infrastructure is expected to create more female 
employment compared to physical infrastructure. In the long run, government spending 
and higher female income is expected to increase productivity, which may partially 
moderate the positive impact of fiscal spending on employment. The long run impact on 
productivity also depends on how much of the rise in paid employment decreases unpaid 
care labour and whether public spending in social infrastructure can more than offset the 
effects of the decline in unpaid domestic care labour. If the short and long term multiplier 
and the productivity effects of public investment in social infrastructure are stronger than 
those of public investment in physical infrastructure, and given the labour intensive and 
domestic demand oriented nature of social infrastructure and occupational segregation, 
such investment  is expected to lead to very strong increases in employment of women as 
well as creating substantial amount of jobs for men in all sectors of the economy due to 
spill over effects of demand from the social sector to the rest of the economy. This policy 
thereby also contributes to closing the gender gaps in employment. According to empirical 
research based on input-output tables (Antonopoulos et al., 2010; Ilkkaracan et al., 2015; 
De Henau et al., 2016), public investment in physical infrastructure creates fewer jobs in 
total and most new jobs are predominantly male jobs; however this research does not 
consider the long term effects on productivity. An empirical analysis of our model for a 
specific economy can further shed light on the gendered policy implications.  
Similar differences in the impact of wages in different sectors follow: as H is more labour 
intensive than N, the impact of a wage increase in H on output is expected to be 
substantially higher.  
With respect to tax policies, if the economy is wage-led increasing the progressivity of the 
tax regime via increasing taxes on capital and decreasing taxes on labour leads to stronger 
positive impact on output. Conversely, if the economy is profit-led, increasing the 
progressivity of the tax system leads to further negative effects on output and 
employment.  
 In this paper we modelled the impact of closing gender gaps only for the case of a rising 
female wage with a constant male wage. The impact of the case of alternative scenario of 
closing gender gaps via an upward convergence can be derived from the model. Similarly, 
the impact of a rise in only male wages, with a constant female wage, (i.e. the case of 
increasing gender inequality) can be derived as well. The impact of increasing wages 
and/or upward convergence in both sectors can be derived by summing up the effects in 
both N and H.  
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Finally, policy mix scenarios can be analysed by adding up the impact of increasing public 
spending and wages. This latter is particularly important in the long-run in a wage-led 
economy where employment may decrease in N despite an increase in output, if the 
output effects are small but productivity effects are large. In this case fiscal spending can 
ensure equality-led growth is combined with employment expansion for both women and 
men.  
Overall, the model can be utilized to empirically analyse a specific economy and develop 
an appropriate policy mix to achieve a gender equitable development given the 
parameters of the economy. 
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